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Member of the Class of 1987
The time has come to close the door on violent criminals who rely
on out-of-date doctrines to frustrate the rule of law. They have be-
come very adept at exploiting the concept of jurisdiction to thumb
their noses at our penal codes. Just by leaving the scene of a crime,
they can effectively repeal our laws and make a mockery of justice.
The most important tool in their arsenal has become an airplane
ticket. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is defined by one commentator as a violent, criminal act,
directed toward an impersonal target, committed in order to cause wide-
spread fear within the community.2 The international community has
not been successful in controlling terrorism through its present legal sys-
tem. This is evidenced by the ineffectiveness of existing extradition trea-
ties and international conventions, which are designed to insure the
effective administration of justice in an international context.
Extradition treaties provide for the surrender of an individual by the
country in which he or she is present to another country that has charged
that individual with a crime committed within its territorial boundaries.3
These treaties, however, do not require extradition for acts or crimes
which constitute "political offenses." 4 Courts of various countries often
1. Trott, Pare Down the 'Political Offense'Doctrine, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 14, 1985, at 12, col.2.
2. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS AND GOALS, DISORDERS
AND TERRORISM 3 (1976).
3. Thompson, The Evolution of the Political Offense Exception in an Age of Modern Polit-
ical Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 315 n.1 (1983).
4. For example, the extradition treaty between the United States and Great Britain pro-
vides that:
Extradition shall not be granted if: ... (i) the offense for which extradition is re-
quested is regarded by the requested Party as one of a political character; or (ii) the
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find that terrorist acts constitute political offenses, and thus, terrorists are
permitted to take advantage of the political offense exception to escape
extradition.5
International conventions also have not provided an effective means
of dealing with the terrorist dilemma. International conventions are
agreements between several nations to achieve a common goal, such as
the extradition of hostage-takers. Such conventions are usually drafted
with the assistance of an international body, such as the United Nations.
Conventions differ from extradition treaties in that International Con-
ventions are multilateral, rather than bilateral, agreements. The ineffec-
tiveness of these Conventions is exemplified by the use of the Geneva
Convention6 by a Nazi war criminal in an attempt to escape extradition.7
The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (The Con-
vention)' provides another such example. Although the Convention was
designed to remedy a specific aspect of terrorist activity-that of hostage-
taking-the Convention includes a variation of the political offense ex-
ception which effectively neutralizes its power to require the extradition
of the terrorist-political offender.
This Note will discuss the policies which provided the impetus for
the original political offense exception and will suggest that these policy
arguments are still valid, but must be clarified in the terrorist context.
This Note will provide an analysis of the obstacles created by the polit-
ical offense exception to the extradition of terrorists. Next, a United
States proposal for legislation to assist the courts in their analysis of the
political offense exception will be explained, and the Convention will be
discussed. The inability of each of these attempts adequately to control
the terrorist-political offender will be examined. This Note then will
trace the history of the political offense exception from its origin in the
English courts in 1891, to the present approaches utilized by the courts
of four countries-Great Britain, France, Switzerland, and the United
States. Through the four country approach, this Note will review cases
that have dealt with the political offense exception, emphasizing cases
person sought proves that the request for his extradition has in fact been made with a
view to try or punish him for an offense of a political character.
Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, art. V, 1, 28 U.S.T. 227,
T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
5. The definition given to a political offense by the courts is discussed infra notes 33-150
and accompanying text.
6. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 150.
7. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir 1957).




involving terrorist activity. Finally, this Note will set forth two separate
proposals for judicial interpretation of the political offense exception, and
will provide a thorough analysis of each of the proposals, with regard to
the benefits each provides to the extradition of the terrorist-political
offender.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE POLITICAL
OFFENSE EXCEPTION
The political offense exception was first espoused in a French circu-
laire9 in which the Government of France declared it would neither seek
nor grant extradition for political offenses."° The first extradition treaty
incorporating the political offense exception was signed on November 2,
1833, by France and Belgium." In 1843, the United States first included
the political offense exception in an extradition treaty with France. 12
Today, the political offense exception is incorporated into each of
the United States' extradition treaties with other nations.1 3 It provides
an exception to the otherwise mandatory obligation imposed upon the
signatories of an extradition treaty: to extradite an individual presently in
the territory of one country to a country which charges him with the
commission of a crime within its territorial boundaries.' 4 A request for
extradition may be denied if the act for which extradition is sought falls
within the confines of the political offense exception.' 5
Two policy considerations underlie this exception. First, it is be-
lieved that a nation should not be required to involve itself in the domes-
tic, political affairs of another nation.' 6 This serves a basic political
function by allowing a government to refuse to surrender a fugitive in
order to remove itself from any involvement in another nation's politics.
Second, it allows a nation to grant political asylum to political dissi-
dents.17 This necessarily requires the nation considering the extradition
9. Official notice.
10. C. VAN DEN WUNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION
12 n.55 (1980).
11. Id. at 13.
12. Convention for the Surrender of Criminals, Nov. 9, 1843, United States-France, 95
C.T.S. 393 (1969). For a general study of the political climate which gave rise to the political
offense exception, see Carbonneau, Terrorist Acts-Crimes or Political Infractions? An Appraisal
of Recent French Extradition Cases, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV., 265, 269-70 (1980).
13. See Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)
14. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
15. Id.
16. Extradition Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1639 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1981) (testimony of W. Hannay).
17. Id.
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request to make a value judgment regarding the nature of the fugitive's
acts and the motives of the requesting nation. The political offense ex-
ception is very important in this regard since it allows for refusal of an
extradition request when, in the opinion of the nation contemplating ex-
tradition, the requesting nation seeks to prosecute the accused not for the
crimes as charged, but for his opposition to that nation's government.
This protects the true freedom fighters for whose benefit the exception
was originally introduced.1
8
The exact criteria for distinguishing an offense which is political in
nature from any other type of offense have never been identified in any
statute or treaty. 19 Instead, interpretation has generally been undertaken
by the judiciary.20 The actual decision regarding whether extradition
should be granted or refused is left to the discretion of the judiciary, at
least at the outset, or to the executive branch.2
III. DIFFICULTIES IN THE TERRORIST CONTEXT
The political offense exception22 forbids the granting of an extradi-
tion request when the crime for which the accused is sought is "political
either in character or in purpose."23 Terrorist activity poses a unique
problem in the application of the political offense exception. Terrorists
can be trained in one country, commit their terrorist activity in another
country, and then escape across the border to yet another country. Ter-
rorist activity usually has a political overtone which, as will be discussed
below, may be interpreted as within the confines of the political offense
exception and, therefore, will preclude extradition.
A. International Hostage-Taking Convention
Several efforts to attack the terrorist problem have been made by
isolating specific acts of terrorism and treating them differently from
other crimes which come within the ambit of the political offense excep-
tion. The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,24
18. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
19. Note, Bringing the Terrorist to Justice: A Domestic Law Approach, 11 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 71, 81-82 (1978).
20. See generally Note, In Re Mackin: Is the Application of the Political Offense Exception
an Extradition Issue for the Judicial or the Executive Branch?, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 565,
570-79 (1982); Note, State Department Determinations of Political Offenses: Death Knell for
the Political Offense Exception in Extradition Law, 15 CASE W. RFS. J. INT'L L. 137 (1983).
21. See supra note 20.
22. See Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, supra note 4.
23. Carbonneau, supra note 12, at 267.
24. The Convention, supra note 8.
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exemplifies such attempts to limit the ability of courts to designate terror-
ist acts as political offenses. It suggests that hostage-taking for any pur-
pose whatsoever is unjustifiable.25 Parties to the Convention agree that
captured hostage-takers must be prosecuted by the capturing state or ex-
tradited for prosecution to the state in which the offense occurred.26 The
Convention contains its own modified political offense exception which
focuses on prosecution, rather than extradition.27 It provides that if the
act charged constitutes a political offense, the accused need not be extra-
dited, but if he is not, he must be tried for his crime in the nation from
which extradition is sought.2" Therefore, between parties to the Conven-
tion, the nation in which the accused is captured is obligated to become
involved in another nation's domestic affairs if it refuses the extradition
request.29 Arguably, the Convention's modified political offense excep-
tion makes the Convention unsuitable for its intended purpose: to elimi-
nate hostage-taking. If the actors know that they will merely be tried in
the country in which they are captured, they can shop for a friendly fo-
rum and find a country that is sympathetic to their cause. To counter
this forum-shopping, terrorists must be prosecuted in the country
wherein they perpetrated their crimes to preserve the deterrent effect of
that forum's criminal justice system, and insure that the political offense
exception will not provide a loophole.
B. A United States Proposal for Legislative Reform
Domestic statutory reform has sought to create a definitive standard
with which to determine a political offense in order to remove judicial
discretion in the context of the terrorist. These reform proposals, how-
ever, have not adequately defined offenses which should be excluded as a
basis for extradition. In fact, crimes of a political nature were defined as
not ordinarily including violent crimes in a proposed piece of legisla-
tion.30 The proposed bill provided that political offense determinations
25. Id. Preamble.
26. Id.
27. Id. arts. 8-9.
28. Id. art. 8 states in part: "The State... shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged,
without exception whatsoever.., to submit the case to its competent authorities for the pur-
pose of prosecution .... " This provision is contrary to one of the primary benefits associated
with the political offense exception, found in most extradition treaties, that the nation in which
the accused is located need not become involved in the internal affairs of the nation which
requests the extradition. A trial in the requested nation would inevitably lead to a determina-
tion of the legitimacy or nonlegitimacy of the accused's political goal.
29. Id.
30. S. REP. No. 331, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 627, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 48-49 (1982).
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would not normally include:
(A) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft . . .; (B) an offense within the
scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Civil Aviation . . .; (C) a serious offense involving an
attack against the life, physical integrity, or liberty of internationally
protected persons.., including diplomatic agents; (D) an offense with
respect to which a treaty obligates the United States to either extradite
or prosecute a person accused of the offense; (E) an offense that con-
sists of homicide, assault with intent to commit serious bodily injury,
rape, kidnapping, the taking of a hostage, or serious unlawful deten-
tion; (F) an offense involving the use of a firearm... if such use endan-
gers a person other than the offender; (G) an offense that consists of
the manufacture, importation, distribution, or sale of narcotics or dan-
gerous drugs; or (H) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense
described in clauses (A) through (G) . . . or participation as an
accomplice.... 31
Sections (A) through (D) basically codify already existing interna-
tional agreements.32 Sections (E) and (F) include most crimes of a seri-
ous nature. Section (G) attacks the drug problem and section (H)
includes conspiracy to commit any of the aforementioned acts. Only the
most minor acts, such as trespassing, would be considered of political
character under this legislation, and thus, would be excluded from extra-
dition. This indicates the difficulty involved in establishing a suitable
definition for political offenses which protects the freedom fighters and
yet requires the extradition of terrorists. This legislation does provide
that the definition be applied in normal circumstances, but does not state
when exceptions to this rule should be made or what those exceptions
should entail. This proposal essentially removes the protection of the
political offense exception from those acts for which the exception was
originally created. Because the same act, for instance, murder, can be an
unjustified terrorist act in one situation and a justified act in another, the
political offense determination should be left, not to the legislature, but
to the judiciary which can provide the necessary flexibility.
C. The Four-Country Judicial Approach
Multilateral efforts to provide an effective framework for the extra-
31. Id.
32. Those international obligations are listed by name in (A) & (B). See also Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, In-
cluding Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S.
15410; The Convention, supra note 8.
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dition of terrorists have not been successful. The political offense excep-
tion may still be used by terrorists to circumvent the extradition process.
Judicial approaches struggle with the unique problem created by apply-
ing the traditional analysis of the political offense exception to terrorism.
Courts of several nations interpret the political offense exception in vari-
ous ways. The most influential approaches are those introduced by the
British, the French, the Swiss, and the United States.
1. The British Test
The first case in which a court interpreted the political offense ex-
ception was In re Castioni,33 decided by a British Queen's Bench court in
1891. Castioni involved a request from the Swiss government for the ex-
tradition of an individual charged with the murder of a government offi-
cial, pursuant to an extradition treaty between Switzerland and Great
Britain.34 The murder occurred during a revolt at the Swiss cantonal
palace of Ticino, which occurred in response to the cantonal govern-
ment's refusal to revise the constitution.35 Castioni was a member of a
revolutionary group which allegedly stormed the palace and seized the
government seat.36 Thereafter, Castioni fled to England.37 The British
court denied his extradition, finding that the crime was "incidental to
and formed a part of political disturbances. '38 The court articulated a
test for determining when an act constituted a political offense:
[W]hether, upon the facts, it is clear that the man was acting as
one of a number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a political
character with a political object, and as part of the political ...
[up]rising in which he was taking part.39
This formulation now is referred to as the "incidence test".'
Commentators have attacked the British interpretation of the inci-
dence test as being both underinclusive and overinclusive.41 It is under-
inclusive in its blanket failure to protect any actor whose political offense
33. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 150-51.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 149.
38. Id. at 166.
39. Id. at 159.
40. Lubet, Extradition Reform: Executive Discretion and Judicial Participation in the Ex-
tradition of Political Terrorists, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 247, 262 (1982).
41. Lubet & Czackes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of Political
Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 203 (1980).
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did not occur as part of a general uprising.4 2 As a result, an actor who is
at the incipiency of a revolution will be extradited while, if he had waited
until the revolution had matured, he would be entitled to the protection
of the political offense exception. It is overinclusive because it protects
all criminal acts which occur during a general uprising, without inquir-
ing into the nature of the act nor the political affiliation of the victim.4 3
It does not consider that some acts are so heinous that they should not
receive the protection of the political offense umbrella, regardless of their
political character. Because this interpretation of the test does not make
any distinction based upon the nature of the criminal act, it is flawed.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the incidence test isinterpreted to distin-
guish between revolutionary activity and terrorist activity, it can be effec-
tive. The In re Castioni court's origination and exposition of the
incidence test remains the source of all political offense interpretation
and the seed from which all other approaches germinated.
A British court examined the political offense exception again in In
re Meunier.' France requested the extradition of Meunier, a self-pro-
claimed anarchist, who was charged with bombing a military barracks
and a Paris cafe. These acts had been taken in revenge for the French
government's execution of another anarchist.45 France imposed a death
sentence on Meunier in absentia.4 6 The court granted extradition in this
case, refining the test for a political offense:
[T]here must be two or more parties in the State, each seeking to
impose the Government of their own choice on the other, and... if the
offence is committed by one side or the other in pursuance of that ob-
ject, it is a political offence, otherwise not.4 7
The court found that Meunier was identified with an anarchist
party, which opposed all forms of government. Thus, even though the
acts in this instance were directed against France's national government,
the court found that anarchy was primarily directed not against a partic-
ular government, but rather "against the general body of citizens."4 In
holding that anarchists such as Meunier did not form a party in opposi-
tion to a state, the political offense exception was held not to apply, and
thus, could not shield Meunier from extradition.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 204. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
44. [1894] 2 Q.B. 415.
45. G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 259 (3d ed. 1976).
46. Id.




Accordingly, the traditional British test requires a two-party strug-
gle for the control of the government. Such a struggle must create, by
definition, an uprising, and the acts committed must be incidental to that
struggle to be considered political. For the British court to find that acts
are incidental to the struggle, they must be directed primarily against a
particular government and not merely against the general populace.
This traditional interpretation of the incidence test does not prevent
the terrorist from escaping extradition by using the political offense ex-
ception. Terrorist activity is usually directed against a particular govern-
ment, for example, where a terrorist bombs a British embassy in Egypt
and then flees to Italy. According to the traditional incidence test, such a
bombing would be incidental to the uprising, and thus, the terrorist could
escape extradition, hiding behind the legality of the political offense
exception.
2. The French Test
The French courts have taken an altogether different approach in
applying the political offense exception. The French developed an "ob-
jective test," which applies only when the contested acts directly injure
the rights of the sovereign.4 9 This test was first set forth in In re Gatti,5°
in which the San Marino government requested the extradition of Gio-
vanni Gatti, who was charged with the attempted murder of a commu-
nist.5 Gatti claimed that his act was committed for political reasons and
therefore requested that the French court apply the political offense ex-
ception to deny the extradition request.52 France granted extradition,
however, finding that Gatti's act did not injure any substantive rights of
the San Marino government and thus could not be considered a political
offense.5 The court construed the political offense exception to be quite
limited in scope. Neither the motive of the accused nor the nature of the
act itself was considered when determining the applicability of the excep-
tion; instead the only inquiry was whether the rights of the state had been
injured by the act.54
49. Recent Decisions, The Political Offense Exception to Extradition: A 19th Century Brit-
ish Standard in 20th Century American Courts, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1010 (1984).
50. 14 Ann. Dig. 145 (Cour d'appel, Grenoble, 1947).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 146.
54. Id.; see also Carbonneau, The Political Offense Exception as Applied in French Cases
Dealing with the Extradition of Terrorists: The Quest for an Appropriate Doctrinal Analysis
Revisited, TRANSNAT'L ASPECTS OF CRIM. PROCEDURE 209 (Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud.
1983).
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French courts, however, have begun a trend away from this narrow
test. A 1953 case, In re Rodriguez,55 held that extradition may be denied
even if the crime committed does not injure any rights of the state re-
questing extradition. In that case, Spain sought the extradition of Rodri-
guez for acts of arson and murder.5 6 Rodriguez requested protection
under the political offense exception, claiming that while Spain ostensibly
sought his extradition for his alleged acts of murder and arson, in reality,
Spain desired to prosecute him for his general opposition to the Franco
government. 7  The French court denied extradition, accepting
Rogriguez' assertion that the act was politically motivated, even though
the alleged acts did not directly injure the rights of the Spanish govern-
ment.5 8 Another case, In re Hennin, 9 involved a request from Switzer-
land for the return of an individual charged with acts of arson directed
against private property. 60 Despite the terrorist nature of Hennin's acts,
the court found that the acts occurred in a heated political climate and
had a political motivation and purpose, and thus, extradition was pre-
cluded by the political offense exception.61
The present nature of the French test is uncertain. French courts
have wavered between the objective test and other, more subjective ap-
proaches.62 One commentator suggests that some recent French political
offense determinations in the terrorist context are indicative of interfer-
ence by the executive branch with the theoretically independent French
judiciary. 63 The trend seems to be toward favoring "the right of asylum
and the freedom of political expression over the international interest in
the punishment of criminal activity."'  Thus, the French trend allows
terrorists to escape extradition, and gain political asylum, by camouflag-
ing their acts as political expression, and demanding application of the
political offense exception.
3. The Swiss Test
Early Swiss cases borrowed the definition of the political offense ex-
55. 2 G.P. 113 (1953).
56. Id. at 115.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Judgment of July 3, 1967, Cour d'appel, Paris Juris-Classeur Periodic, La Semaine
Juridique (J.C.P. II) No. 15274.
60. Id.
61. Id.; see also Judgment of Jan. 3, 1968, Cour d'appel, Paris J.C.P. II No. 15387.
62. See Cour d'appel, J.C.P II at No. 15274 (1967); Cour d'appel, J.C.P. II at No. 15387
(1968).
63. Carbonneau, supra note 12, at 286.
64. Id. at 279.
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ception from the British, applying the incidence test of In re Castioni.6
5
Later Swiss cases, however, reveal the application of a somewhat differ-
ent test, concerned more with the character of the offense than the exist-
ence of a political uprising. The political offense exception is applied by
Swiss courts if the political nature of the crime "predominates" over the
commonality of the crime.66
In a case regarding a hostage-taker named Vogt,67 a Swiss court
enunciated three factors to be considered in this determination: (1) the
motivation of the actor,68 (2) the circumstances which existed at the time
the crime was committed,69 and (3) a balancing between the political ob-
jective sought and the means used to accomplish that end.70 Vogt's ex-
tradition was sought for his alleged act of holding civilians hostage, as
opposed to holding members of the government hostage. The defend-
ant's political objective allegedly was to remove the police forces from
the location of a food riot.71 The Swiss court granted extradition, finding
that Vogt's violent methods outweighed his political objective.72 The
court stated, in dicta, that as the means employed become increasingly
oppressive, the political objective sought must similarly intensify.7 3 Ac-
cordingly, this decision suggests that a sliding scale is to be used in these
determinations.
In a more recent case,7 4 the Swiss court granted extradition, finding
that the political nature of the defendant's act did not predominate over
the common character of the crime.7" The case involved a request by
France for the return of Ktir, an Algerian Liberation Movement mem-
ber, who had been charged with murder.76 The Swiss court stated that
65. In re Ragni, 49 BGE 1 266 (Switz., Fed.Tr. 1923), reprinted in English in 2 Ann. Dig.
286.
66. In re Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic, 78 ATF 1 39 (Switz., Fed.Tr. 1952), reprinted
in English in 19 I.L.R. 371, 373; In re Ficorilli, 77 ATF 1 57 (Switz., Fed.Tr. 1951), reprinted
in English in 18 I.L.R. 345.
67. In re Vogt, 50 BGEI 249 (Switz., Fed. Ct. 1923), reprinted in English in 2 Ann. Dig.
285.
68. See In re Kaphengst, 56 BGE 1 457 (Switz., Fed. Ct. 1930), reprinted in English in 7
Ann. Dig. 292, 293.
69. See In re Ockert, 59 BGE 1136 (Switz., Fed. Ct. 1933), reprinted in English in 7 Ann.
Dig. 369, 370.
70. In re Vogt, 2 Ann. Dig. at 285; See also In re Nappi, 78 ATF 1134 (Switz., Fed. Ct.
1952), reprinted in English in 19 I.L.R. 375, 376.
71. In re Vogt, 2 Ann. Dig. at 285.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Ktir v. Ministere Public F6d6ral, 87 ATF I 134 (Switz., Fed. Tr. 1961), reprinted in
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the heinous nature of the crime of murder necessitated that murder be
the only means of attaining the political end. If so, the political nature of
the crime could be said to predominate, and the actor thereby would be
entitled to the protection of the political offense exception.77
Accordingly, under the Swiss predominance test, an offense will be
found to be political in nature only if its political aspects outweigh its
common elements. While the Vogt decision 78 cites three elements for this
determination, in actuality, the Swiss courts use an ad hoc approach.79
Even though this type of approach can be labelled as suspect due to the
immense discretion vested in the court, it may effectively control terrorist
misuse of the political offense exception. Because Switzerland is politi-
cally neutral and has no political motivation unduly influencing its deci-
sions in political offense determinations, it is unlikely that it will abuse
the discretion inherent in its flexible, ad hoc approach.
4. The United States Test
a. Pre-Quinn Cases
Since 1894, United States courts have applied the incidence test of
In re Castioni.80 This standard was first adopted by a District Court in
In re Ezeta, 1 a case involving a request by the Salvadoran government
for the extradition of a deposed dictator charged with murder and rob-
bery. The court reviewed and approved the In re Castioni incidence
test82 and denied extradition, finding Ezeta's acts incidental to and in
furtherance of a political uprising.8 3 The Supreme Court has addressed
the political offense issue only once, in the case of Ornelas v. Ruiz,
4
which involved an extradition request from Mexico based on charges of
murder, arson, robbery, and kidnapping. The Supreme Court found that
even though the acts occurred during an uprising, they were basically
unrelated to the uprising, and thus extradition was granted. The deter-
minative factor was that "immediately after this occurrence, though no
superior armed force of the Mexican government was in the vicinity to
hinder their advance into the country, the bandits withdrew with their
77. Id. at 144.
78. In re Vogt, 50 BOEI 249 (Switz., Fed. Ct. 1923), reprinted in English in 2 Ann. Dig.
285.
79. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
80. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
81. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
82. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
84. 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
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booty across the river into Texas."" The bandits' flight indicated that
although an uprising had occurred in Mexico at the time of the alleged
acts, the acts were not incidental to that uprising since they were basi-
cally unrelated to the revolution. Dicta in the opinion suggested that
several factors must be evaluated in determining whether an act consti-
tutes a political offense, including: (1) the character of the act charged,
(2) the method used in the perpetration of the act, (3) whether the act
resulted in death or the taking of hostages, and (4) whether any property
was involved and the extent of damage thereto. 6
Lower courts, however, have generally applied the incidence test of
In re Castioni with extreme rigidity and have ignored the factors enumer-
ated in Ornelas v. Ruiz." Application of the incidence test has led to
inconsistent results. For example, in United States ex rel. Karadzole v.
Artukovic,88 the Yugoslavian government requested the extradition of
Artukovic, the minister of internal affairs in Croatia during World War
II. He was charged with the murder of over 200,000 civilian prisoners in
Yugoslavian concentration camps, specifically by the issuance of "orders
based on criminal motives [and] hatred ... to carry out mass slaughters
of the peaceful civilian population .... ,,s9 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that Artukovic was protected from extradition by
the political offense exception by applying a rigid analysis of the inci-
dence test. The court found that because the crimes occurred during the
invasion of Yugoslavia, when factions were vying for control of the gov-
ernment, the offenses were political under the incidence test.90 The
Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's opinion in this case by issu-
ing a one-paragraph per curiam opinion and remanded for an extradition
hearing.9" The Supreme Court "did not comment on the substantive is-
sues and may well have based its order solely on the fact that the habeas
court considered the legal questions involved in Artokovic's extradition
85. Id. at 511 (quoting Mr. Secretary Gresham, in a memorandum to the Minister of
Mexico).
86. Id.
87. Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1036
(1980); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 1980); Garcia-Guillern v. United States,
450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta,
311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 48 (1963); In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp.
717, 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Ramos v. Diaz 179 F. Supp. 459, 463 (S.D. Fla. 1959).
88. 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959). See also Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245,
(S.D. Cal. 1956), affd sub nom. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), va-
cated, 355 U.S. 393 (1958).
89. 247 F.2d at 204.
90. Id.
91. 355 U.S. 393 (1958). Artukovic was finally extradited to face murder charges in Yu-
goslavia for his war crimes.
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before an extradition court had an opportunity to make the preliminary
findings mandated by section 3184.
"92
The nature of the accused's target is increasingly important under
recent cases applying the incidence test. This new emphasis, like the in-
cidence test itself, creates inconsistent and arbitrary results. For exam-
ple, In re McMullen 93 involved a British request for the extradition of an
Irish Republican Army (IRA) member charged with the bombing of a
military barracks. The court denied extradition, finding that the conflict
in Northern Ireland constituted a political uprising and that McMullen's
acts were incidental to and in furtherance of that uprising.94 Later, how-
ever, in Eain v. Wilkes,95 when Israel sought the extradition of a Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO) member in connection with the
Tiberias bombing of a marketplace, which resulted in the deaths of two
boys, extradition was permitted. 96 Eain requested the protection of the
political offense exception, using an argument strikingly similar to the
one used successfully in In re McMullen just two years earlier.97 Eain
argued that there was a conflict in Israel that involved violence, and the
PLO, a group to which Eain belonged, was a party to that violence.98
The only difference between the crimes charged in In re McMullen and
those in Eain v. Wilkes was the nature of the target: in the latter a civilian
market, and in the former, a military barracks. The Eain court, however,
added a new requirement that evidence must show a "direct link between
the perpetrator, a political organization's political goals and the specific
act."9 9 The court allowed Eain's extradition, agreeing with the magis-
trate's finding that Eain failed to prove "that the bombing was incidental
to the PLO's objectives."'" The court did not divulge whether its deci-
sion was based on the nature of Eain's target, which would distinguish
this case from In re McMullen, or on the lack of nexus between the spe-
cific act, the PLO's objectives and Eain himself. In United States v.
Mackin,101 Great Britain requested the extradition of another IRA mem-
ber charged with the attempted murder of a British soldier. In applying
the political offense exception and denying extradition, the United States
92. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 799 (9th Cir. 1986).
93. No. 3-78-1899 M.G., slip op. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
94. Id.
95. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
96. Id. at 507.
97. Id.; see also supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
98. 641 F.2d 518.
99. Id. at 521. This new requirement is referred to as the nexus requirement.
100. Id. at 520.
101. 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
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magistrate found it important that Mackin's acts were directed against
military personnel while the petitioner's acts in Eain v. Wilkes were
aimed at the civilian population. 102
As demonstrated above, United States courts have not applied a
consistent standard for the application of the political offense exception.
The recent cases have looked too closely at the nature of the target and
have not applied the factors set forth in Ornelas v. Ruiz.10 3 The courts
have a difficult time applying the rigid incidence test, especially in the
terrorist context, and arrive at inconsistent results."° The In re McMul-
len court noted that this rigidity of the incidence test creates a problem,
stating: "Even though the offense be deplorable and heinous, the crimi-
nal actor will be excluded from deportation if the crime is committed
under these prerequisites." 10 5 These shortcomings of the United States
approach to the use of the political offense exception by terrorists were
addressed in the recent case of Quinn v. Robinson.106
b. The Quinn Case
In the most recent United States political offense decision, Quinn v.
Robinson, 07 the United Kingdom requested the extradition of William
Joseph Quinn, a member of the IRA charged with commission of a mur-
der in Northern Ireland and conspiracy to cause explosions in
London.10 8 The district court determined that Quinn's extradition was
barred by the political offense exception.109 The Ninth Circuit vacated
the writ of habeus corpus and remanded," 0 finding that the charged of-
fenses were not protected by the political offense exception.' The court
acknowledged, however, that its decision was handed down "with the aid
of very little helpful precedent."
' " 2
The bombing conspiracy alleged in Quinn v. Robinson involved six
specific bombing incidents. None involved a military target; each of the
bombings was directed towards the civilian population. Quinn was also
charged with the murder of Police Constable Stephen Tibble. Because
102. Id.
103. See supra note 84-86 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
105. No. 3-78-1899 M.G., slip op. at 3 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
106. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1985).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 781.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 818.
111. Id. at 782.
112. Id. at 781.
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Constable Tibble was not in uniform, however, Quinn may not have been
aware of Tibble's official status. Thus, neither the murder nor the bomb-
ings may have been directed at any military target, a factor which was
probably determinative in Eain v. Wilkes and other previous cases.
1 13
The Quinn court criticised courts which, in recent decisions, nar-
rowed the political offense exception by overemphasizing the importance
of the nature of the accused's target. 14 The Quinn court insisted that the
traditional political offense test is "ideologically neutral" and that "quali-
tative judgments regarding a foreign government or a struggle designed
to alter that government" are inappropriate for judicial determination.
11 5
Rather, the court felt such judgments were political questions within the
confines of the factors enumerated in Baker v. Carr.I16 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided that United States courts should not
judge the political legitimacy of specific revolutionary tactics, including
those directed against civilians. 117
In addition, the court in Quinn v. Robinson decided against requir-
ing the actor to be a member of a clearly identifiable group seeking to
overthrow the government before considering an act to be of political
character. 18 Accordingly, the court rejected the application of the Brit-
ish test as enunciated in In re Meunier. 9
In contrast to the organized, clearly identifiable, armed forces of
past revolutions, today's struggles are often carried out by networks of
individuals joined only by a common interest in opposing those in
power.
... [It] is not our place to impose our notions of civilized strife on
people who are seeking to overthrow the regimes in control of their
countries.... It is the fact that the insurgents are seeking to change
their governments that makes the political offense exception applica-
ble, not their reasons for wishing to do so or the nature of the acts by
which they hope to accomplish that goal.
1 20
The Quinn v. Robinson court then re-examined the incidence test
first espoused in In re Castioni and reaffirmed its viability, especially in
the context of the terrorist political offender. The court stated that the
drafters of the political offense exception never contemplated its use to
113. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
114. 783 F.2d at 787.
115. Id. at 804.
116. Id.; see also 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
117. 783 F.2d at 804. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
118. 783 F.2d at 809.
119. [1894] 2 Q.B. 415.
120. 783 F.2d at 804-05.
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protect acts of international violence from prosecution, "regardless of the
ultimate objective of the actors." 121 The court noted that the accused is
extradited to the country in which the alleged acts occurred, and that the
government of that nation may not be the one which the accused sought
to influence by his acts. Accordingly, there is less risk of an unfair trial,
or punishment for the actor's political views, and thus, less justification
for the invocation of the political offense exception.122 For example, if a
terrorist murdered a United States Army officer in Italy and fled to Ar-
gentina, he would be extradited to Italy. Since the terrorist sought to
influence the United States government and not that of Italy, Italian
courts would not be likely to be influenced by the terrorist's political
views. Accordingly, the risk of an unfair trial is greatly reduced, and
therefore, there is less justification for using the political offense
exception.
The two requirements of the incidence test are that there be a polit-
ical uprising and that the act be incidental to that uprising.123 Most cases
have dealt with the latter requirement in detail and have only cursorily
examined whether or not an uprising existed.' 24 The court in Quinn v.
Robinson used the uprising component to remove the protection of the
political offense exception from terrorists. The court stated that an upris-
ing occurs only when a "requisite amount of turmoil" is caused by "fun-
damental efforts to accomplish change." In addition, the court
concluded that an uprising referred only to a "revolt by indigenous peo-
ple against their own government ... [and] only within the country or
territory in which those rising up reside."'
125
In applying its interpretation of the incidence test to the facts of that
case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that an uprising existed
only in Northern Ireland at the time of Quinn's alleged acts. 126 The
magistrate, on the other hand, had determined that because Northern
Ireland and London are both, at least constitutionally, a part of the
United Kingdom and, because the acts in both locations were directed
against the same government, an uprising existed "throughout the
United Kingdom" at the time of Quinn's acts.' 2 7 The Ninth Circuit re-
jected the lower court's constitutional unit theory and concluded that
121. Id. at 806.
122. Id.
123. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
124. Only Ornelas ever dealt thoroughly with this issue. See supra note 84 and accompany-
ing text.
125. Id. at 807.
126. Id. at 813.
127. Id. at 810.
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there was no uprising in England at the time of Quinn's acts because the
level of violence outside Northern Ireland was insufficient in itself to con-
stitute an uprising, and English citizens or residents were not generating
that violence which existed. 128
The critical factor is that nationals of Northern Ireland, seeking
to alter the government in that territorial entity, exported their strug-
gle for political change... to a separate geographical entity-and con-
ducted that struggle in a country in which the nationals and residents
were not attempting to alter their own political structure. 1
29
Thus, the Ninth Circuit added a new factor to political offense de-
terminations: The accused must be indigenous to the area where the acts
are perpetrated before he will be eligible for protection under the political
offense exception.' 30  Because the court granted Quinn's extradition
based on the lack of an uprising in England, it never reached the question
regarding what role, if any, Quinn's status as a nonresident of Northern
Ireland may have played in the political offense determination.
The Quinn court applied its reasoning to the facts of Eain to show
that the application of the traditional incidence test would have achieved
the same result as that reached by the Eain court, without resorting to a
dramatic change of the test, as did that court in its creation of the nexus
requirement. 13' The Ninth Circuit court found that because the Israelis
had not been engaged in any violent activities to overthrow their govern-
ment, there was no uprising, 132 and therefore Eain's acts could not have
been incidental to an uprising, as is required.133 In applying its new resi-
dency or nationality requirement 3 4 to the facts of Eain v. Wilkes, the
Quinn court questioned whether Eain could have invoked the protection
of the political offense exception even if an uprising was in existence,
since he was not a resident or national of Israel. "In the absence of a
tangible demonstration that he or she has more than a transitory connec-
tion with that land, the acts of a foreign national may simply not qualify
for protection."'' 35 Given the court's alternative basis for deciding this
128. Id. at 813.
129. Id.
130. The court also noted in dicta that the murder of a police officer is incidental to an
uprising if the motivation of the killer was either to restrain the discovery of firearms or to
avoid the reduction of his groups' forces, which would occur as a result of his capture. Id. at
811.
131. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
132. 783 F.2d at 807.
133. The fact that the PLO sought to overthrow the government of Israel does not, in itself,
create an uprising under the Quinn v. Robinson court's analysis. Id.




case, this hypothetical discussion is the only hint regarding future inter-
pretation of the new residency requirement.
136
The second requirement of the incidence test, that an act be inciden-
tal to an uprising, was construed liberally by the Quinn v. Robinson
court. While the court stated that there must be a "nexus" between the
act and the uprising,'37 the accused's membership in a group involved in
an uprising 13 should not determine whether the protection of the polit-
ical offense exception is appropriate. 39 The court noted that such a re-
quirement: (1) is inconsistent with the rights of the accused; (2) may
violate the accused's Fifth Amendment rights since it may force him to
supply circumstantial evidence of his guilt, and membership itself may be
illegal; and (3) membership is difficult to prove. 14°
The court listed some factors that, while not determinative, assisted
evaluation of the political nature of the act: (1) proof of membership in a
group involved in the uprising, (2) similarity between the charged offense
and other acts committed by the uprising group, and (3) the degree of
control exerted over the accused's acts by the uprising group. The court
stated that any of these factors could make it more likely that the ac-
cused's act would be considered incidental to the uprising.1
41
Evidence that the accused's acts were committed for purely personal
reasons, however, could negate any factors suggesting that a nexus ex-
ists. 142 Thus, under a liberal nexus standard, the Quinn v. Robinson
court found no reason to distinguish the political nature of the act based
upon the military or civilian nature of the target. 1 43 Rather, the court
looked at whether the act itself was likely to have been politically moti-
vated within the context of that particular uprising, without regard to the
military or civilian nature of the target. 1" The Quinn court realized that
even acts directed against a civilian target may fall within the confines of
the political offense exception depending upon the nature of that particu-
lar uprising. 14-
136. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
137. Id. at 809. Under this standard, "neither proof of the potential nor actual effective-
ness of the actions in achieving the group's political ends.., nor proof of the motive of the
accused... or [that of] the requesting nation.., is required." Id.
138. This requirement was introduced in Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); see also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
139. 783 F.2d at 809.
140. Id.
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The Quinn court also reexamined its earlier decision of Karadzole v.
Artukovic which held that war crimes may still be considered political
offenses despite their barbaric and atrocious nature.146 The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals rejected its application of the political offense ex-
ception in Karadzole v. Artukovic and stated some sweeping limitations to
the exception. 47 The court characterized Artukovic's acts as "crimes
against humanity" '48 and concluded that crimes of such magnitude were
not protected by, and were entirely beyond the scope of, the exception.'49
The Quinn court also stated that skyjacking, piracy, and acts committed
on the high seas were not entitled to the protection of the political offense
exception. 150
c. Quinn v. Robinson's Effect on the Application of the Political
Offense Exception to Terrorist Acts
The Court of Appeals in Quinn v. Robinson has taken a major step
towards eliminating the use of the political offense exception for ter-
rorists who attempt to escape extradition. Its application of the inci-
dence test was faithful to the nineteenth century In re Castioni
definition" 1 while, at the same time, it updated the test to solve twentieth
century problems. One difficulty with Quinn v. Robinson, however, is
that certain activities are excluded from the political offense exception
because they occur outside the geographical location of the uprising.1 52
This limitation is stated by the court without any support from precedent
nor from legal commentators. Rather, these activities are excluded with
a sweeping, unsupported statement, that "[t]he political offense exception
was never intended to reach such conduct." 153
The court also stated that skyjacking has never been a traditional
method of revolutionary activity, and thus should not be allowed the pro-
tection of the political offense exception.1 54 This, however, is in direct
conflict with its statement that insurgents themselves decide on the tac-
146. Id. at 799-800; see also supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
147. 783 F.2d at 799-800.
148. Id. Crimes against humanity are defined by the court as crimes in violation of interna-
tional law and acts carried out "by or with the toleration of authorities of a state." Id.
149. Id. at 799, 817; but see infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
150. Id. at 807. This is somewhat akin to the approach of the statutory reform proposal
since it isolates certain specific crimes from those within the ambit of the political offense
exception.
151. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
152. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text. Examples of such activities would
include skyjacking and piracy.




tics for their own revolutions.15 Judge Duniway noted in his concurring
opinion that with the rapid transportation available today, genuine revo-
lutionary activities could occur outside the geographic boundaries of the
requesting state.156 He asked, rhetorically, whether the United States
would (or should) have granted a request from Great Britain for the ex-
tradition of John Paul Jones for piracy on the high seas. While everyone
would agree that the war crimes charged in Karadzole v. Artukovic
should never be considered political in nature, the Quinn v. Robinson
court's arbitrary characterization of other acts as nonpolitical in nature,
such as piracy, would require a court following this standard to grant
extradition even for true revolutionary activity, as shown by the John
Paul Jones example.
Another difficulty with Quinn v. Robinson is the territorial limita-
tion imposed by the court: namely, the area to which an uprising will be
considered to extend. The majority limited the geographical boundary of
the uprising to the country in which the requisite amount of violence was
present, but refused to extend that boundary to other locations under the
control of the same sovereign. 7 Judge Fletcher, who partially con-
curred in the decision, disagreed with the majority's proposition on geo-
graphical boundaries.15 ' He did not see any reason why the same exact
acts, directed against the same people (the British rulers), should be pro-
tected by the political offense exception when committed in Northern
Ireland but not when committed in London." 9 The Ninth Circuit could
have limited the boundary of an uprising to the particular city or cities in
which a sufficient amount of violence was present, a "zone of violence"
test, but chose not to do so. Rather, it extended the boundary to the
entire geographical unit of Northern Ireland, but refused such extension
to the entire political unit of all the territories under the control of Great
Britain. 60 The court should have taken this extra step suggested by
Judge Fletcher' so that revolutionaries can reach the government in
power, which may have more effect in England than in Northern Ireland.
By restricting the area of the uprising to Northern Ireland, the Quinn
court's decision may make it impossible for an IRA revolutionary to
reach the government of Great Britain by threatening its existence at its
government seat, namely, in England.
155. Id. at 804-05.
156. Id. at 818 (Duniway, J., concurring).
157. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
158. 783 F.2d at 819 (Fletcher, J., concurring and dissenting).
159. Id. at 820.
160. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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The current United States test, after Quinn v. Robinson, is quite dif-
ferent from the approaches used by other countries. The two most dis-
tinctive aspects of the United States approach are the geographical
limitation of the uprising area, discussed above, and the requirement that
the acts must be committed by one who is indigenous to the area of the
uprising. 62 The United States test does not balance the objectives of the
actor against the means used, a distinctive feature of the Swiss ap-
proach. 163 Instead, the Unites States test includes a warning to the
courts that they should not attempt to judge the means used by the
revolutionaries.164
The Quinn v. Robinson court has crafted a standard that may easily
be interpreted to deny the invocation of the political offence exception as
an exculpatory mechanism while, at the same time, it allows the political
offense exception to protect true revolutionary activity. The shortcom-
ings of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's new interpretation of the
incidence test should not detract from the monumental effort of a United
States court in attempting to deal with the transnational terrorist of the
1980s while still adhering to the basic framework of In re Castioni.
Quinn v. Robinson demonstrates that the judiciary, when given a clear
standard with the necessary flexibility, can provide an effective mecha-
nism for dealing with the problem of the transnational terrorist, where
both legislative reform and multilateral efforts have failed.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR A NEW DEFINITIONAL
STANDARD
The political offense exception must be redefined to protect legiti-
mate political actors while preventing terrorists from abusing this defense
to extradition. Two possible definitional frameworks are described below
to enable the judiciary to make political offense determinations, even in
the terrorist context. One approach combines elements of the Swiss and
United States tests, and the other is the Quinn v. Robinson test, modified
to comport more closely to the underlying policy reasons of the political
offense exception. The only reason that two different proposals are pro-
vided is that the judiciary of certain nations may prefer a combination
approach while others may prefer adherence to the basic limitations of
the incidence test.
Elements of different approaches that have been utilized by various
162. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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nations in defining a political offense can be combined to create a new
formulation for this important exception to extradition which will pro-
tect the activities of true freedom fighters, while requiring the extradition
of terrorists. By combining dicta from Ornelas v. Ruiz165 together with
aspects of the Swiss decisions discussed above, 166 a basic framework for a
new definitional standard of political offenses emerges. 67 In Ornelas v.
Ruiz, the Supreme Court stated that the nature and mode of the crime
should be considered in any political offense determination.1 61 This ap-
proach is more sophisticated than the basic incidence test, since it takes
into account the seriousness of the act, the methodology chosen for ac-
complishing the act, and the act's reflection on the accused's culpability.
This type of inquiry allows a court to distinguish terrorist acts from other
revolutionary activity. The Quinn v. Robinson court did not accept this
reasoning, stating that this type of inquiry is undesirable because it re-
quires a court to judge the legitimacy of the revolution, by inquiring into
the nature of those activities.1 69 This is not necessarily persuasive since
an act can only be considered terrorist based upon the norms and mores
of society. One cannot help but judge the nature of the acts if he or she
ever hopes to separate terrorist acts from general revolutionary activity.
The Swiss court, in the case concerning the hostage-taker Vogt, ex-
amined the motivation of the accused and the political and factual cir-
cumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. The court then
balanced the political objective sought to be achieved by the commission
of the crime against the means chosen to accomplish the desired political
objective.17 Regarding the alleged murderer Ktir, the Swiss court held
the crime of murder to be so serious that it must be the only means of
achieving the desired political objective to merit the protection of the
political offense exception.171 For crimes of an extremely serious na-
ture,1 72 courts should similarly require the act to be the only reasonable
means of achieving the political objective. Reasonableness must be in-
jected into the test or it will fall prey to the underinclusiveness of the
165. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
167. The Swiss approach was criticized by the Quinn court as involving inquiries which
may be political questions and thus outside the permissible judicial scope. Ornelas, however,
stated in dicta various factors which are similar to those in the Swiss cases.
168. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 31 and accompanying text, particularly § (E). This would include
homicide, assault with intent to commit serious bodily injury, rape, kidnapping, the taking of a
hostage, or serious unlawful detention.
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incidence standard 7 ' and of the language of the statutory reform propos-
als.'7 4 To determine the reasonableness of an act, courts should apply
the balancing approach of the Swiss case Vogt, T' by requiring that as the
means employed become increasingly oppressive, the political objective
sought must similarly intensify in urgency and importance.
To summarize, in determining whether an act constitutes a political
offense, a court should inquire into the nature and mode of the crime, the
motivation of the accused, and the circumstances which surround the
commission of the crime. The court should then balance the political
objective against the means chosen to accomplish that objective. Fur-
thermore, crimes of an extremely serious nature must be the only reason-
able means of achieving the political objective before they will be
considered a political offense. Such a definitional approach would pro-
vide courts with a more workable standard for determining whether
crimes for which extradition is sought are political, and therefore pro-
tected by the political offense exception. This proposed standard would
not produce mathematically precise results, but instead would allow for
flexibility in judicial determinations. The above guidelines would pro-
duce decisions true to the underlying principles of the political offense
exception and would also deny a safe haven to terrorists. For example, in
applying this proposed standard to the facts of the Eain v. Wilkes case,' 76
the court would, at the outset, have to determine whether murder of a
civilian was the only means of accomplishing Eain's political objective,
namely, the destruction of the State of Israel. Clearly, his acts could not
satisfy this requirement, and thus extradition would be granted.
Another suitable definition for the political offense exception, which
would deny protection to terrorists and still protect those political of-
fenders for whom the exception was originally formulated, could be
achieved through modifications of the incidence test described by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Quinn v. Robinson.'7 7 The difficulties
with this decision'78 are twofold. The first difficulty involves both the
geographical limitations in the incidence test, which defines the area to
which an uprising will be considered to extend, and the exclusion of cer-
tain tactics from the protection of the political offense exception. 7 9 The
second problem is the contradiction posed by the court's insistence that it
173. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 123-50 and accompanying text.




is improper for the judiciary to decide which tactics are acceptable. 180
Remedying these two problems would create a clearer standard for judi-
cial application.
A new definition of the geographical area to which the court can
ascribe the label of uprising "should be formulated, to allow certain revo-
lutionary activities to be protected if they occur in areas outside the ac-
tual "zone of violence." 181 The geographical boundary of an uprising
should extend at least to the location of the sovereign's seat of govern-
ment and possibly to any location under the control of the same sover-
eign. Thus, in Quinn v. Robinson, the court should have extended the
area of the uprising in Northern Ireland to acts perpetrated in London
and possibly even to those occurring, for example, in the Falkland Is-
lands. This broader geographical boundary for an uprising would allow
the revolutionary activity to reach locations controlled by the same sov-
ereign, and thereby affect the sovereign wherever he may be located.
To meet the uprising requirement, the actor must also be a national
or resident of the geographical entity in which the requisite amount of
violent activity is present. Under this new standard, while Quinn's acts
in London fall within the confines of the geographic limitations of an
uprising, the protection of the political offense exception would still be
denied because he was not a resident or national of Northern Ireland (the
location of the requisite amount of violent activity). Then, Quinn's only
hope of protection under the political offense exception would be to make
a "tangible demonstration that he ... has more than a transitory connec-
tion with that land." '182 This could be established by the length of time
he lived in that area, whether he has applied for citizenship, and other
factors that tend to show a connection with that territory, for example,
marriage to a citizen.
The second difficulty with Quinn v. Robinson, the conflict between
stating that the court will not tell the revolutionaries which tactics are
acceptable and the court's exclusion of certain tactics, can be cured by
merely stating outright that certain tactics are not part of accepted revo-
lutionary activities and will not be accorded the protection of the polit-
ical offense exception. Tactics such as skyjacking, piracy, hostage taking,
crimes against humanity, and other tactics which are proscribed by inter-
national conventions should be excluded from the exception. This type
of blanket exclusion is certainly preferable to the inconsistent language in
Quinn v. Robinson. Thus, under this standard, these activities are cer-
180. Id.
181. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
182. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 808 (9th Cir. 1985).
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tainly not necessary for political change and should never be considered
incidental to an uprising.
Both of the proposals suggested above will protect those seeking to
change their form of government through political activism, while insur-
ing that terrorists do not escape extradition for their crimes. The first
approach is more flexible and will work more efficiently than the second,
where the judiciary is completely independent from political coercion
from the executive branch. In such countries, the added flexibility will
enable courts to keep pace with the new methods of the terrorist. It will
ensure that terrorists will not escape extradition by some clever manipu-
lation of a loophole which could appear in a more rigid standard. The
second approach is true to the incidence test and provides a solid basis
for the viability of the test, at least with respect to current terrorist tac-
tics. This approach is less likely to fall prey to an overzealous executive
branch which pressures a politically-controlled judiciary, because the
rigid boundaries of the test would force the judiciary to adhere to it in-
stead of political pressures. Thus, each test is valid for a different na-
tional structure, and under each test the political offense exception would
be revitalized to protect those for whom it was originally developed and
would be removed from the terrorist's armory.
V. CONCLUSION
The political offense exception is still necessary to protect political
activism. The exception, though, must not be offered to terrorists as a
method of escaping extradition and prosecution. The incidence test,
when first enunciated in 1891, was a bold proclamation of the interna-
tional community's desire to protect true revolutionary activity. The
proposals stated above are not as bold, but would proclaim loudly that
terrorists who merely flee the scene of a crime will not be afforded any
protection. The laws will not provide a loophole under which their acts
can be considered political, but rather, will require extradition so that
their acts will be seen in their true form: as the desperate acts of
cowards.
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